The article unpacks the issues of bias or partisanship-and the risk of being accused of these-which confront social scientists who study socio-political conflict. Drawing on the author's experience when conducting research on the conflict between animal liberation activists and their state and corporate adversaries in Britain (1999Britain ( -2014, the article argues for a relational research approach-focusing on the interaction between contending parties, rather than study stakeholders singly-as a way to overcome challenges of taking sides when studying socio-political conflict. The debate generated by Howard Becker's classic essay "Whose side are we on?" (1967)-now fifty years old-is used throughout the article as a point of reference for addressing the issues involved. The argument is made for constant reflexivity during research on radical social movements, and for "temporary bias" during qualitative fieldwork.
Introduction
My background in the animal rights movement raises concerns when I study conflicts over animal liberation activism. How does my background impact the research on those that I study? Compared to other scholars, those with activist backgrounds seem to face more frequent accusations of bias and partisanship. Indeed, the ways in which social scientists deal with the issue of bias and with accusations of taking sides-that is, actively supporting the opinions and positions of research participants-have important implications for both researchers and the researched (Liebling 2001) . These issues are particularly acute in the study of social movements and the socio-political conflicts connected with them. Such conflicts, by definition, involve several competing actors, and the side/s in the conflict one takes as a starting point, or uses as one's main source of data, will inevitably affect how its/their perspectives are understood, and what knowledge is produced. Partiality in one's treatment of the parties involved becomes a key methodological issue in this type of research.
The article consists of four parts. The first describes the case study (the interaction between a social movement campaign and its state and private opponents in Britain) and the questions that it raises regarding bias and partisanship given my activist past. The second part, "Negotiating Antagonistic Social Worlds," then identifies challenges inherent to the study of conflicts in which "superordinates" (e.g., criminal justice agencies) and "subordinates" (here, transgressive protestors) interact. A "relational" research approach is then suggested as a partial "solution" to overcome some of the challenges-or, at least, treat them as analytical advantages. The third and fourth parts of this article, entitled "Positionality and positioning: Researching what, how and for whom?" and "Value-neutrality and Partisanship:
What and where is my standpoint?" respectively, explores issues of positionality and partisanship, and argues for constant reflexivity while studying radical social movements and "temporary bias" during qualitative fieldwork. Throughout the article, Howard Becker's classic essay "Whose side are we on?" (1967)-and the discussions it has inspired-serve as a reference point for unpacking different dimensions of bias and partisanship, both as regards research on socio-political conflict generally, and my own research.
Context: Studying Interaction between Protestors and Agents of Policing
The articles is based on a research project examining the interaction in Britain between the international Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign, criminal justice agencies, and corporate actors in the course of a fifteen-year conflict, from the campaign's inception until its end (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . From the start of my research project, the need to reflect on, and tackle, issues of bias and partisanship has been pressing, precisely because of my participation in the broader animal rights movement, and concern this has raised about whether I might merely reproduce movement narratives or be otherwise influenced by a vested interest in the animal rights cause. My closeness to the field, even though I was not active in the SHAC campaign, is thus a key methodological concern determining the issues I raise.
SHAC was launched in 1999 by grassroots activists from the British animal liberation movement. This radical movement 1 distinguishes itself from the mainstream animal rights movement by its willingness to engage in direct action; it favors non-institutionalized and extra-parliamentary forms of political participation, and often goes beyond what is defined as 1 According to Dearey (2010:25-26) , "radicalism in the animal rights movement is similar to that of the more radicalized spectrum of the environmental movement and other radical social movements (notably radical feminism): they resist compromise and remain determined to eliminate the structures, institutions and practices associated with the targeted organizational hegemony rather than seeking to reform them from within." 5 legal protest. SHAC was established with the single aim of closing down Huntingdon Life Science (HLS), Europe's biggest contract animal testing laboratory. HLS became a target because of the extensive testing and experiments on animals it conducted on behalf of other companies, including some of the world's largest corporations (e.g., GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis). Opposition to HLS involved different tactics, including a wide range of lawful forms of protest (e.g., demonstrating outside the animal testing laboratories), various forms of non-violent civil disobedience (e.g., blocking the entrance to the laboratories), and unlawful forms of clandestine direct action (such as the destruction of property). In addition to HLS itself, people behind the company, such as directors, and employees, were targeted.
The campaign achieved its greatest successes by challenging HLS directly (its premises, property and personnel), and later by targeting any person or organization linked to it. The campaigners induced over two hundred and fifty companies to sever ties with HLS.
These included some of the world's wealthiest financial institutions (e.g., Citibank) and companies (e.g., Marsh). HLS was also de-listed from the London Stock Exchange in 2001, while its parent company was barred from being listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 2005-all because of the protests in the UK, USA and beyond (Adetunji and Postelnicu 2005 ).
SHAC's short-term successes and tremendous impact eventually caused the British government to react, following organized lobbying by those who had been targeted. The government subsequently stepped in, using the arm of the criminal justice system to aid HLS.
At the same time, SHAC's achievements inspired other activists and enabled the campaign to grow and spread internationally.
The reach and impact of SHAC was unprecedented in the history of the international animal liberation movement. The counter-responses subsequently employed by criminal justice agencies and corporations, however, were also unprecedented in the history of the movement's operation in liberal democracies (Ellefsen 2016a parties to a conflict; and (2) how can several stakeholders be included in the study to enhance understanding of the overall conflict? As noted above, Becker (1967) provides a useful starting point. Becker's (1967) concept of hierarchy of credibility points to the difficulty of giving attention to the perspectives of both the superordinates and the subordinates in a conflict. He also underlines specific challenges for research in politicized situations:
When we do research in a political situation we are in double jeopardy, for the spokesmen of both involved groups will be sensitive to the implications of our work. Since they propose openly conflicting definitions of reality, our statement of our problem is in itself likely to call into question and make problematic, at least for the purposes of our research, one or the other definition. And our results will do the same (Becker 1967:244) .
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In such situations, the hierarchy of credibility implies that the opposing parties are both likely to accuse the researcher of bias if their adversary is given "too much" attention. Gouldner According to Gouldner, one cannot do justice to both. Is this really the only possible view? As
Hammersley points out, however, Becker's (1967:245) actually assertion is that "there is no position from which sociological research can be done that is not biased in one or another way." But here bias is understood in a mild sense-as the inability to grant equal consideration to all parties in the research field, which is an underlying methodological issue in any social research. When researching socio-political conflict, including several stakeholders can enable one to better understand the conflict. While this might involve both personal and cognitive challenges for the researcher, who has to maneuver between antagonistic worldviews and social groups, including several conflicting stakeholders in the study is nonetheless fundamental to overcome a one-sided focus, and to capture the overall dynamics of the conflict.
In a critique of another of Becker's works, The Outsiders (1963) , and of labeling theory, more generally, Gouldner (1968) frames Becker's perspective as one in which the process of making someone, some group or some thing "deviant" (e.g., the criminalization and marginalization of a specific protest group) cannot be understood unless deviants, and rule-making and rule-enforcing procedures or persons, are studied together. From this, the question of from whose side one should explore the issues follows. But such an interpretation treats Becker's argument very narrowly. Becker (1967:247) actually advocates understanding both perspectives-those of both superordinates and subordinates-while calling for the use of "theoretical and technical resources to avoid the distortions that might be introduced into 9 our work." Becker's point rather seems to be that one can never do equal justice to both parties' perspectives (Hammersley 2001) .
I have included the perspectives of, and data from, several contending actors in my research, and the conflict is marked by clear lines of division and "Us-vs.-Them" rationales.
When moving between (and among) the opposing parties to collect data, I frequently felt that my own outlook was being influenced by the narrative that I was currently hearing. And, indeed, when one shift between opposing sources of data, the cognitive challenge of balancing contradictory worldviews can be profound. For example, when I moved from analyzing hostile mainstream media stories about transgressive animal liberation protestors to participant observation among the same protestors, I experienced a temporary sense of confusion because opposing narratives representing colliding worldviews and rationales, temporarily distorted my understandings.
It is precisely these shifts between clashing sources of information, however, and one's efforts to negotiate them, which can obviate the limitations of contemplating only one side. I discovered that both data sources had their own logic and way of making sense of reality that was plausible and "true" from the perspective of the teller. In a constructionist sense, then, I was not interested in who was "right" but rather in how the battle between different narratives accompanied the material conflict between protestors and agents of repression (see e.g., Henry and Milovanovic 1999) .
In general, including both parties to a conflict in one's research, and exposing their opposing narratives, can strengthen one's overall understanding of the issues and dynamics at play (see, e.g., Satterfield 2002) . Liebling (2001) writes that synthesis between different or competing perspectives sharpens the researcher's focus, and that the struggle to balance them can be a crucial part of his or her research. Wahlström (2011:60-61 ) puts forward a similar view in his study of the nature of the interactions between police and protestors: "I would 10 argue that it is actually one of the main advantages of studying two opposing groups, that confrontation with contradictory perspectives on the same events can be used by the researcher as a corrective for becoming caught in either life-world." Wahlström acknowledges the cognitive challenge of this approach when he states that this advantage also entails an "occasional sense of schizophrenia" (Wahlström 2011:61) . This is another way of describing the "existential disorientation" (Ferrell and Hamm 1998) referred to abovesomething I felt strongly when moving between data from opposing parties to the conflict.
Despite the discomfort that accompanies such a shift, exploring the conflict from several antagonistic perspectives can lead to a better understanding of the conflict as a whole. In my research, the concurrent understandings of the opposing parties repeatedly surprised me: they gave very similar descriptions of key events and turning points in the fifteen-year conflict.
When looking back on this, it becomes clear just how strikingly similar were the understandings of how and why the conflict evolved. These concurrent descriptions thus strengthened the data, as antagonistic actors confirmed what the key elements of the conflict were.
Researching the repression of a social movement without including its opponents would exclude elements crucial to understanding it. While this is true in general, it was particularly apropos in the context of the SHAC campaign, which emerged, developed, and The entire act of scientific study is oriented and shaped by the underlying picture of the empirical world that is used. This picture sets the selection and formulation of problems, the determination of what are data, the means to be used in getting the data, the kinds of relations sought between data, and the forms in which propositions are cast […] The unavoidable task of genuine methodological treatment is to identify and assess these premises. (Blumer 1969:24-25) Blumer The ways in which a discipline conceptualizes the world it studies can change that world (Harding 2009 ). This is the avowed assumption of standpoint theorists, who take the position of a particular social group, such as women, for example, claiming that this offers epistemic advantages that can help improve women's situation and standing in society. Much published research, however, does not explicitly state, or otherwise discuss, why a particular analytical scheme or specific conceptual tools are chosen, or what implications the use of politicized concepts such as "extremism" or "terrorism" might have for the scholarly field, for one's self-positioning, and for those being studied. When studying people who either identify as political radicals or who are labeled "deviants," "extremists" or "fanatics," it is crucial to reflect on the analytical concepts chosen because they have serious implications, particularly for those being researched.
In 2006, SHAC was branded a "terrorist organization" in the United States under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act. Activists from SHAC in the UK-who were the main subjects of my study-were described as "dangerous animal rights extremists" in the media, while the term "domestic extremism" was used by the UK government and police. In such a terrain, the naming and labeling of a group's ideology and actions became important and The ways in which researchers position themselves by their choice of scholarly topics, and the traditions they follow, connect to specific issues of self-positioning within academia.
As Croteau (2005:30) observes, "Mainstream research addressing mild policy reforms, rather than work that engages with concrete and strategic issues connected to specific contemporary struggles, is better able to compete for major funding and, therefore, is more likely to be a route to academic success." In other words, certain types of research are more likely to further an academic career. Self-positioning within the academic environment thus involves a negotiation of structural and personal traits, with scholars under pressure to make certain choices if they want to gain funding and secure sustained employment. A set of structural conditions and contextual norms thus has an influence on what will appear viable and attractive to researchers in the course of their academic careers. These influences form part of what Bourdieu (1977) refers to as doxa-the undiscussed, undisputed and taken-for-granted.
A reflexive social science seeks to acknowledge explicitly and reflect openly on how these influences impact research, which is something frequently under-explored-and often ignored-in social science. Questions about bias and taking sides are seemingly more 16 frequently directed at scholars defining themselves as part of a critical tradition, those with an activist background, or who make their standpoint (in the various meanings of the word) clear.
But the same demand for reflection on one's values and sympathies, as well as on the influences of structural pressures and contextual norms, must be addressed by all researchers, whether they are conflict-or consensus-oriented or profess no particular orientation in their approach.
Warnings about "going native" relate to the possible pitfalls of adopting the worldview of research participants. One should, however, also strive to detach oneself temporarily from "native assumptions"-one's own culturally ingrained values and norms, which might differ greatly from what is taken for granted by those being studied. This implies that the inability to set aside, or critically reflect on, one's own values and cultural lenses should be seen as a risk of comparable gravity to that of "going native." Attempting to detach oneself temporarily from one's values, particularly during fieldwork, can thus be a useful way to reflect on how one's cultural norms impact the research. Researchers are exposed to influences of which they are not necessarily aware, and this affects how they proceed (Prieur 2002b) . That is the reason why Bourdieu, like Dorothy E. Smith (2005) , demands that the position of the observer (the researcher) should be the object of the same kind of critical analysis we employ when investigating other objects or people (see Widerberg 2008 , for a discussion). Such reflexivity is particularly important when studying radical social movements, as Milan (2014) argues, to avoid ethical and analytical pitfalls: both so that research participants are not negatively affected, and to help make more conscious choices during research.
Value-neutrality and Partisanship: What and where is the researcher's standpoint?
Let me return now to Becker (1967) , who questions whether a truly objective social science, in the positivist sense, is an attainable-or even desirable-goal. Many now accept 17 that researchers cannot avoid making assumptions about the world-assumptions that have not been independently tested and which will shape their work in fundamental ways (Hammersley 2000) The issues of bias and taking sides thus remain important to qualitative and ethnographic researchers. In his influential essay, Becker (1967) Objectivity could mean maximizing neutrality (Harding 2004) or minimizing subjectivity (Cousin 2010 ), but researchers cannot be "objective" or "neutral" in the sense that their scientific inquiry is not influenced, or in some way affected, by their position-because all knowledge is situated, in the sense that it is always produced from a specific position, and thus represents one specific view of the world (Smith 2004) . These assumptions represent a key concern of the so called "reflexive turn" (Foley 2002) , which refers to the shift away from focusing on minimizing subjectivity to thinking more about how to bring oneself into the research process by acknowledging that "our knowledge is always mediated and interpreted from a particular stance and through our available language, and that we should own up to this in explicit ways" (Cousin 2010:10) .
It bears mention that choosing a standpoint from which to start empirical exploration should be seen as something different from taking sides in terms of sympathies and partisanship. By "standpoint," I mean an initial position in an empirical exploration, as understood within the research program of institutional ethnography (see, e.g., Smith 2005) .
Institutional ethnography begins with, but is not limited to, locating a standpoint in an institutional order that provides the guiding perspective from which that order will be explored (Smith 2005) .
I started my exploration among activists, but did not stop there, or limit my data to them. Rather I started with activists because I felt an affinity to and for them, but also to locate the actions and actors they experienced as crucial in supporting them, affecting them, and trying to dismantle their campaign. Here, the standpoint represented the starting point from where initial explication began and evolved to include their adversaries. This contrasts with the more avowedly partisan approaches of feminist (or other) "standpoint theory," which prioritizes a specific oppressed or stigmatized group (e.g., women), often arguing that this offers epistemic advantages 3 and a commitment to bringing about more just societies (see, e.g., Sollund this issue). Acknowledging the situated nature of knowledge production and the researcher's unavoidable impact on the research process does not mean a resigned acceptance of partisanship-of doing research in such a way as to serve some (e.g., political) cause (Hammersley 2001) or biased point of view.
Bias is generally regarded as something to be avoided; it may be defined as "any systematic deviation from validity, or to some deformation of research practice that produces such deviation" (Hammersley 2000:152) . One reading of Becker-that of Hammersley (2001)-interprets "bias" as "a relative and contingent matter which depends on who is in power and the stance the researcher takes towards them." This implies bias is a product of the research situation rather than a feature of the researcher's work itself (Hammersley 2001 ) and points to conditions external to the researcher. This is somewhat different from what is often meant when a charge of bias is leveled, such as when a researcher selects data to fit a preconceived agenda (Risjord 2014) . The ambiguity of the concept of bias reflects inherent challenges in Becker's article because many readers take it to justify taking sides in the partisan sense.
Hammersley suggests that Becker was in fact "not arguing that researchers must choose which side they are on in such a way as to serve it" (2001:99-100). In qualitative and ethnographic research, it is not possible to give equal consideration and attention to all parties, perspectives and positions. Thus, a measure of choice and prioritization is unavoidable, without necessarily being partisan. This also applies to a relational research approach to socio-political conflict, which includes several contending actors. For example, in my study, the amount of data from activists slightly exceeds that of their adversaries. Hammersley (2001) suspects that Becker considers sociological research as politically partisan in its effects-with such an impact being an inadvertent (yet desirable) by-product of a sound scientific approach-and not the result of the data-gathering process. Becker, according to Hammersley, would not favor this latter form of political partisanship. Hammersley's reading stands stark contrast to that of Gouldner (1968) , who asserts that Becker and others comprising the "Chicago School" clearly adopt a standpoint identifying with deviant rather than "respectable"
society. In defense of Becker, one should acknowledge that making one's standpoint(s) explicit does not mean bias or partisanship in favor of one group over another. Even though I began my research by studying activists, this does not mean that I adopted their worldview or sought to use my position as a researcher to promote their perspectives and ideologies. Rather, the aim was to understand their perspectives and opportunities and constraints for effective protest.
In a response to Becker's (1967) published, but that is a less controversial and fundamentally different form of value than that internal to the researcher and the research process.
Closely linked to questions of value-neutrality, partisanship and bias is the accusation made against researchers that they lack distance from research participants. This brings us to the question, addressed below, which has been a constant concern in my own research: Where should the researcher draw the line between a closeness that is desirable, because it is a prerequisite for in-depth understanding, and over-involvement and lack of distance?
The question of whether a researcher has "gone native" is another aspect of bias and taking sides, and relates to the balancing of closeness to and distance from research Prieur takes issue with the assertion in Ethnography: Principles in Practice (Hammersley and Atkinson 1987) that distance is a prerequisite for being able to "offer more than autobiographical accounts" (quoted in Prieur 2002a). She contends that a researcher's 22 distance from his or her research subjects can be a source of naiveté and can lead to the erroneous belief that one knows more about the research subjects than may actually be the case. She further maintains that, in her research, knowing required a degree of empathy with-and closeness to-the research participants.
Sensitivity towards research participants-and deeper understanding of them-are hard to achieve without getting to know them and their lived experience. Empathy is essential to having a real chance of putting oneself in the research participant's place. Critical analysis is important, but this must come after a level of understanding has been achieved (see Prieur   2002a ). Closeness is thus an advantage during ethnographic fieldwork, but a level of distance should be reestablished at the analytical stage. Remaining "a native" during analysis and writing is detrimental to the quality of the research (Prieur 2002a:148) . In the same vein, Gouldner (1975, In sum, Ferrell and Hamm (1998), Liebling (2001) and Prieur (2002) all consider closeness and "temporary bias" to be necessary for a proper understanding of the people being researched, while insisting that such closeness is beneficial only in one phase of the research process. My own research has led me to agree with these scholars' positions.
Conclusion
This article, using the example of a case study of the interaction of social movement campaigners with state and corporate adversaries in Britain, has attempted to unpack issues 23 relating to bias and taking sides for the researcher conducting qualitative research on sociopolitical conflict. The article has argued that a relational research approach can be employed-one that concentrates on various dimensions of contending parties' interaction over time. This type of dynamic approach, emphasizing the contradictory views of the various actors, can bring about a better understanding of the overall conflict, and contrasts with static research perspectives that study actors singly. As a researcher with an activist background in the animal rights movement, I found the relational approach particularly helpful as a way to tackle various methodological concerns arising from my closeness to the field I was studying.
Throughout the article, the debate generated by Becker's classic essay "Whose side are we on?" has served as a reference point to explore the challenges of research in politicized situations where several actors are in contention, as well as to flesh out the different dimensions of bias and partisanship. The article has also argued for "temporary bias" during fieldwork, so as to gain a better understanding of the worldviews and experiences of research participants. At the same time, the need for reflexivity throughout the research process has been emphasized. Such reflexivity and temporal bias not only has implications for the scientific inquiry and those being researched, but involves explicitly self-critical (reflexive) practices that may well influence the researcher's view of both conventional and deviant social practices.
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